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1
SUPRENME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
2
SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS.
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.

COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY. 4
SUPREME COURT COIMISSION OF OIIO.5
ACTION.

Multiplicity of Suitts-Knowledge of Remewdy, &c.-Where, of certain
stock stolen and purchased by a third party, tile owner replevied a portion and afterward brought trover for the remainder, and it appeared
that at the time of the firstsuit he had knowledge of the conversion of
a portion of the stock claimed in the second, leld, that for that portion
his second action would not lie, but contrawvise as to that touching the
conversion of which he was ignorant. The rule prohibiting multiplicity of suits has no reference to a case where the party has no knowledge of his means of redress : Moran v. Plankinton et al, 64 Mo.
ADMIRALTY.

Collision-Duty of Sailing TVessels.-Sailing vessels approaching a
steamer are required to keep their course on account of the correlative
duty of the steamer to keep out of the way, in order that the steamer
may know the position of the object to be avoided, and that she may not
be baffled or led into error in her endeavor to comply with the requirement: Davy et al. v. Good, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
Where both vessels are in fault where a collision occurs, the damages
must be divided : Id.
BANKRUPTCY.

See Corporation.

See Surety.
Liability ofParties.-Whenevera negotiable promissory note is drawn
up, and is then signed by the maker thereof, and is then endorsed in
blank, first by the payee thereof and then by a third person, and the'
note is then delivered by the maker thereof for a sufficient consideration
to still another person, who thereby becomes the holder thereof, the presumption in such a case should be and is, that the payee and said third
person intended to assume, and did assume, all the rights and privileges
as well as all the obligations and liabilities, usually assumed by endorsers
of negotiable instruments. Therefore, where a note is executed, endorsed
and delivered in the foregoing manner : HIeld, that the endorsers will be
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discharged unless due demand of payment is made and due notice of
non-payment given to the endorsers :. Bradford v. _Nelson et al., 18 Kaus.
COMMON CARRIER.

Railroads-Damages-StockPass-Bjectionof Wjte.-In an action
of damages against a railroad company, by a A. and his wife, for ejecting the latter from a train, it appeared that A. made a special contract
with defeudant for the transportation of stock, which contract provided,
that none but the owner or persons in charge of the stock should be entitled to a return pass. A. applied to the agent of the road for a pass
fbr his'wife, stating that she was the owner of a part of the stock;
wheieas, she neither owned nor had charge of any of the stock. On this
statement the agent issued the pass, saying at the time that he had no
authority to issue one to a lady, and doubted if the conductor would
recognise it. The pass was given " on account of stock account surrendered," and bore endorsed on the back an acceptance by the wife, subject to its conditions and with the expressed stipulation, that the company should not be liable for any injury to -herperson or property. The
wife, being in company with her husband, offered her pass, which the
conductor refused to recognise, and on her declining to pay the required fare, handed her, without any violence or incivility, from the
train ; whereupon the fare was paid and plaintiffs re-entered the train
and proceeded upon their journey : Held, that the procurement of the
pass from the agent, by misrepresentations, was a fraud upon the company which vitiated the contract; that it was obviously the intention of
A. to pay the fare, if necessary to enable his wife to ride, and in view
of this fact and the conduct of the conductor, plaintiff had no ground
for punitive damages, such as might be given in case of a real expulsion : Brown et al. v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway, 64 Mo.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

See ANiavigable Streams.

CONTEMPT.

See Equity.

CONTRACT.

See Fraud.

CORPORATION.
See Receiver.
aie-Fraudof Officers-Bankruptcy.-A corporation may acquire
a name by usage, as by retaining its original name after a change thereof was authorized by an act of the legislature, and an adjudication in
bankruptoy made against it by the name so acquired is valid: Alexander v. Berne9y, 28 N. J. Eq.
The assignee in bankruptcy of an insurance company may cause to be
set aside the cancellation of a mortgage belonging to such company,
where such cancellation was made under a resolution of the directors,
obtained by the fraud of the president for his benefit, and without consideration: Id.
But advances by a director, made to pay the debts of the company,
and secured by a mortgage upon the land so discharged, will be protected : Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Shackles on Prisoner-Powerof Court in Criminal Trials.-As a
general rule a prisoner is entitled, as a matter of right, to be freed from
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his shlekles when brought into the court-room for trial, but this rule is
nut of' universal application. The court has the power to take all necessary steps to have the trial a quiet and safe one, even to binding the
prisoner with fetters. But there must be some good and sufficient
reason for pursuing such extraordinary course, else the judgment of
conviction will be reversed; and the fact that the prisoner had made, in the court-room, an assault upon a person, will not justify his being
shackled three months thereafter, when put upon his trial: State v.
1&ring, 64 Mo.
DAMAGES.

General Benefit not Ground of Set-off.-F. builds a dam and mill on
his own land, the dam raising the water in the stream caused it to overflow the land of M., an upper riparian owner. The mill was of no special
benefit to M. or to his lands, and the only benefit that M. received therefrom was that general benefit 'which accrued to all in the vicinity from
the building a mill in their midst : theld, in an action by D. to recover
damages for the overflow of his land, that F. could not off-set or reduce
those damages by the general benefits resulting to NI. from the building
and proximity of the mill: Afarcey v. Fries, 18 Kans.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Application of Payments.-Where a debtor, who owes to his creditor
several distinct debts, xiakes a payment to his creditor, the debtor may
apply such payment to any one of such debts which he chooses; and if
he does not make the application then the creditor may do so ; but if
neither makes any such application, then the law will make the application in the manner which is most equitable, and, in doing so, the law
will generally apply the payment to the oldest debt, or to the earliest
item of the same debt, or to a debt that is due in preference to one that
is not due; and generally where one debt is secured, and the other is
not, the law will apply the payment to the debt which is not secured:
S iellabargerv. Binns, 18 Kans.
EQUITY.

See Receiver.

Contempt-Injuncton.-A common rumor that an injunction has been
dissolved, will not excuse the breach of it: .Aforris, Adm'r, v. Hill et al.,
28 N. J. Eq.
Presumptionsfrom lapse of Time-fortgage.-Presumptions do not
always proceed on the belief that the thing presumed has actually taken
place: Downs v. Sooy, 28 N. J. Eq.
A mortgagor who comes into equity for relief against a mortgage on
which no payment nor claim of any kind has been made, nor any proceedings taken, for thirty years, is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of payment: Id.
EXECUTOR.
FOREIGN

See Trust.
JUDGMENT.

Effect of, as Eridence.-The recitals of a judgment obtained without
personal service in a sister state, and by publication, where none of the
defendants to the suit make any appearance in the court rendering the
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judgment, are no evidence of debt, nor tender of a deed, in a separate
action pending in this state between the same parties to recover upon
a promissory note : Iles v. Elledqge, 18 Kans.
FRAUD.

See Common, Carrier.

Contract-Rescission-Laclkes.-Oneseeking the rescission of a contract because of fraudulent representation, must offer to rescind promptly
on discovering the fraud, but in the absence of proof showing when the
fraud was discovered, it is not error to refuse to say to the jury: " And
in the absence of proof tending to show that so long a time was necessary,
six months is not a reasonable time." Nor in giving it with the qualifying words, " but it must be tendered back, at furthest, so soon after
discovery of fraud (in which plaintiff must use reasonable diligence),
that the estate would not be damaged by delay, and could be put in stat
quo :" Parmlee, Adrn'r, v. Adolph, 28 Ohio St.
Under an allegation that the payee of the note was insolvent when the
alleged fraudulent representations were made, and exchange of notes
effected, and so continued; in the absence of proof showing when the
fraud was discovered, the mere faet of the holder proving the claim in
bankruptcy does not work such a change in the relation of the parties to
the transaction as will preclude a rescission of the contract: Id.
To constitute representations fraudulent so as to be a ground for the rescission of a contract, they must be both false and fraudulent. If they
are made with an honest belief, at the time, of their truth, they are not
fraudulent; but if made recklessly, and without any knowledge or
information on the subject calculated to induce such belief, and they are
untrue, then they are fraudulent: Id.
HOMESTEAD.

Mortgage-Judgment-Creditor.- A. and wife execilted a mortgage to
G. on their homestead and other real estate. Subsequently D. obtained
a judgment against A. After A.'s death his wife and children continued to occupy the homestead. G. foreclosed his mortgage, and in the
decree with his consent it was ordered that the real estate other than
the homestead be first sold. L. who was a party to the foreclosure proceedings objected and insisted that the boniestead be first sold : Bhld,
that there was no error in the order and that the equities of the family
of the mortgagor in the homestead were superior to the claims of the
judgment-creditor: La Rue v. Gilbert et al., 18 Kans.
JUDGMENT.

Cotemporaneous Agreement as to Satifaction by4pay/ment of a less
Amount-Co-defendants, Release of part.-Where in a litigated case one
of three co-defendants made default, and the other two consented to a
judgment against all three, for a sum agreed upon as fixing the amount
of plaintiff's damages, upon the condition that they should be released
upon payment of their two-thirds of the amount: Reld, that this agreement would not prevent the enforcement against them of the remainder
of the judgment, and that such a state of facts would not authorize equity
to interfere by injunction to prevent its collection from them : Knight v.
Cherry et al., 64 Mo.
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LACuES.

See Fraud; Lis Pendens.
Lis PiENDENS.

Laches-Neglience.-The benefit of the rule relating to lis pendens
may be lost by such long-continued inaction as amounts to gross negligence in the party prosecuting, when such inaction is to the prejudice
of innocent persons: Fox v. Reeder, 28 Ohio St.
A mortgage was executed in 1837, upon which bill of foreclosure was
filed in 1840, decree taken and order for sale issued in 1842. Save con-,
tinuances, no further action was had in the case until 1868. In the
meantime, the mortgagor, who had remained in open and notorious possession, had sold portions of the premises to innocent purchasers, without actual notice of the pending suit. Such purchasers, and those under
whom they claimed, had remained in actual possession more than twentyone years, when the plaintiff in the foreclosure suit, in 1869, caused to
be issued another order of sale : Held, that the failure to take any action
in the cause from 1842 to 1868, unexplained, was such negligence as
prevented an enforcement of the decree against actual purchasers, without actual notice: Id.
M4ALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
Probable Gause-A deice of Counsel need not be toprosecte-Aalice.In an action for malicious prosecution, if the defendant show that he
was advised by counsel that plaintiff was liable to the prosecution, he
need not, in order to show "probable cause," go further and show that
lie was advised to bring the prosecution. And when so advised of his
rights, proof of malice on his part will not render him liable: Burrs v.
North, 64 bio.
In suit for criminal prosecution, an instruction that in order to make
out a case of probable cause, defendant was bound to show that he was
actuated by a desire to protect his family, was held improperly given : Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

Cotractor-Liabilityof Principalfor Acts of.-When a railroad is
being constructed, and is in the exclusive possession of and operated by
a contractor for its construction, and the railroad company at the time
the injuries complained of are committed, has no control thereof, such
company is not liable for the damages resulting from the operation of
such railroad; and in such case the maxim, Respondeat superior, does
not apply: Kansas Central Railway Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 18 Kans.
M1ECIIANiCS'

LIEN.

MTILL DAM.
DMORTGAOE.

See Mortgage.

See Damages.

See ComToration; Eqzuity.

Foreclosu-e- What Partiesnot Necessary.-In a suit by a junior mortgagee to foreclose a mortgage, prior mortgagees are not necessary parties
where the bill or the junior mortgagee seeks only a foreclosure or sale of
the equity of redemption : Jerome et al. v. AleCarter, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1876.
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Lien of-ilfechanics' Licn.-Wherc a vendee entered into possession
under an agreement to convey, and gave a purchase-money mortgage in
pursuance thereof, such mortgage, although not delivered until a house
built by the vendee on the premises was nearly finished, is entitled to
priority over a mechanics' lien thereon : Paul v. Hoeft et al., 28 N. J. Eq.
NAVIGABLE

STREAMS.

Jurisdictionof ,State-Provisionof Constitution of United States as
to Immnnities of Citizens of the Several Statcs.-Each state owns the
beds of all tide-waters within its jurisdiction, unless they have been
granted away: Mcready v. State of Virginia, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1876.
In like manner the states own the tide-waters themselves and the fish
in them, so far as they are capable of ownership while running. For
this purpose the state represents its people, and the ownership is that
of the people in their united sovereignty : JR.
By article 4, sect. 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the
citizens of each state are "entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states." The citizens of one state are not invested, however, by this clause of the Constitution, with any interest in
the common property of the citizens of another state: Rd.
The state of Virginia granted the exclusive privilege to its own citizens to plant oysters in Ware river, a stream in that state where the
tide ebbs and flows, and prohibited the citizens of other states from
doing so : Hel, that the state had the right so to do, and that its
action was not in conflict with the federal Constitution : Id.
NEGLIGENCE.

See Railroad.

Driving Fast-Raeing.-Where M., being the owner and in the possession of a horse and buggy, driven by himself, asks S. to ride with him,
.and S. accepts the invitation, ind thereafter M. overtakes C. on a public
highway, driving a team of horses, and attempting to pass C. and his
team, races with him on the road against the protest of S., and thereby
refuses to stop and let S. out of the buggy as he requests, and drives so
carelessly and negligently that his buggy strikes the fence along the
side of the road, and overturning, .throws S. violently out against the
fence and on the ground, and S. is injured thereby: .ield, that l. is
guilty of such negligence as to be liable to S. for the injuries received
by him in being thrown from the buggy: Mayberry v. Sivy, 18 Kans.
Proximate Cause, what Constitutes.-The true rule is, that what is
the proximate cause of an injury, is ordinarily a question for the jury.
It is not a question of science or of legal knowledge. It is to be determined as a fact, in view of the circumstances of fact attending it.
The primayy cause may be the proximate cause of a disaster, though it
may operate through successive instruments, as an article at the end of
a chain may be moved by a force applied to the other end, that force
being the proximate cause of the movement: Milwaukee f St. Paud
Railway, Co. v. Kellog, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
The question always is, was there an unbroken connection between
the wrongfiul act and the injury, a continuous operation ? Did the fiects
constitute -a continuous succession of events, so linked together as to
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make a natural whole, or was there some new and independent cause
intervening between the wrong and the injury ? Id.
PARTNERSHIP.

Payment of Private Debt with Firm Funds.-One partner cannot
apply the funds of a partnership in payment of his private debt, without the assent of his co-partners, and an action may be maintained by
the assignee of the firm to recover the amount so applied against the
party receiving the same: Thomas v. Pennrich, Assignee, 28 Ohio St.
PAYMENT.

See Debtor and Creditor.

PRESUMPTION.

See Equity.

RAILROAD.

Damnum Abseque .Tnuria.-A railroad company, in the usual and ordinary performance of its business, is not liable for a purely accidental fire
caused by fire escaping from one of its engines : The Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston Railroad Co. v. Cook, 18 Kans.
Neqligence-Ejectment of Passengerwhile Car in Aotion.-Whether
it is due and proper care to attempt to remove a person from a street
railroad car, while the same is in motion, is a question of fact for the
jury, and not of law for the court: Healey v. City Passenger Railroad
Co., 28 Ohio St.
If the driver of such car has authority to collect fare, and to put a
person off for its non-payment, his master will be liable, if injury results
from excessive force and violence in so doing, or if, as driver, he is
guilty of carelessness or negligence in keeping the car in motion, by
reason of which the person is run over and injured: Id.
Where the injury complained of results from want of care in the
driver in running the car, and not from the force and violence used
in ejecting a person from the car, the company would be liable, whether
the .driver had or had not authority to collect fare: Id.
RECEIVER.

A person connected with the management may not be appointed
receiver of an insolvent corpbration : Freeholders of Middlesez Cbunty
v. State Bank of New Brunswick, 28 N. J. Eq.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

From State Courts to Circuit Courts- construction qf Acts of Congress
in Reference thereto.-The Act of March 2d 1867 (14 Stats. 558) provides
for the removal of causes from the state courts to the circuit courts,
under certain circumstances, when due application is made " b~fore the
final hearing or trial of the suit." This means "before final judgment
in the court of original jurisdiction where the suit is brought." (See
Stevenson v. Williams, 19 Wallace 575.) The Act of March 3d 1875
(18 Stats. 471) requires the petition to be filed "before the final trial."
The decisions under the Act of 1867 are, therefore, equally applicable
to that of 1875: Lowe v. Williams, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
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SALE.

Warranty-Not implied.-In the sale of a horse there is no implied
warranty of soundness : Matlock v. Meyers, 64 11o.
A representation of soundness or other quality is not necessarily a
warranty. To have that effect it must be so intended and understood,
and not be the expression of a mere matter of opinion: Id.
The representation that she is "a good mare" is not a warranty of
the soundness of the animal: Id.
SURETY.

Alteration of Oblgation-Dischargeof-Changing the rate of interest in a note from six to seven per cent. is a material alteration: Harsh
et al. v. bMpper, 28 Ohio St.
Such alteration, when made by the principal with the consent of the
holder and owner, but without the consent of the surety, discharges the
surety, though such alteration was made without fraudulent intent: Id.
TAX.
Imposed on Succession to Real Estate-Act of Congress- What Estates
within its meaning.-Not only vested estates, but also estates which are
not vested, those in expectancy merely, are within the statute of 1864
imposing a tax upoi the "succession to real estate :" C7lpp v. ason
et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
TRUST.
Executor-Assgnment of Goods as collateralfor Privatedebt.-Where
an executrix, who was life-tenant of certain stock of the estate, assigned
it as collateral security for the debt of some of the remaindermen, Held,
an abuse of the trust: Prallet al. v. Hamil et al., 28 N. J. Eq.
The transfer and receipt. of the stock, as stock of the estate then standing in the testator's name, is conclusive proof that the pledgees knew
that such stock belonged to the estate, and it was their duty, under the
circumstances, to ascertain whether the executrix had the right to transfer the stock as proposed; and, if such duty was disregarded, they cannot claim protection on the ground of bona fides and ignorance: Id.
UNITED STATES COURTS.

Jurisdictionmust appear from Record-Mandamus.-The facts upon
which the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States rests must in
some form appear in the record of all suits prosecuted before them. To
this rule there are no exceptions: Ex parte Smith, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1876.
Where these facts do not appear, the Supreme Court will not issue a
writ of mandamus compelling the Circuit Court to take jurisdiction : Id.
WARRANTY.

See Sale.

